Page 19 - 《中国药房》2021年第6期

基于三方演化博弈的粤港澳大湾区药品监管策略优化研究 Δ

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石荣丽 ，沈 凯 ，赵笑妍（1.广东药科大学医药商学院/广东省药品监管科学研究基地，广东 中山 528000；
2.江苏恒瑞医药股份有限公司，南京 214500）

中图分类号 R95 文献标志码 A 文章编号 1001-0408（2021）06-0653-10
DOI 10.6039/j.issn.1001-0408.2021.06.03

摘 要 目的：为完善粤港澳大湾区药品安全监管机制提供参考。方法：基于演化博弈理论，对粤港澳大湾区药品安全监管阶段
利益相关者进行识别，构建演化博弈模型，通过模型求解得到各方主体的行为选择演化稳定策略，并为完善粤港澳大湾区药品安
全监管机制提出建议。结果与结论：本研究基于演化博弈理论构建了药政机关、药检机构和药品生产企业的三方演化博弈模型。
根据本研究建立的模型，可知当生产企业的合规成本小于违规成本与贿赂花费之和减去所获得的额外收益，或者小于违规成本加
上惩罚和名誉损失之和减去所获得的额外收益时，均能实现生产企业合规生产的均衡状态；监管概率与监管成本成反比，严格检
测率与检测成本成反比；合规生产率、严格检测率与监管强度和处罚罚款成正比，且监管概率越高，严格检测率就越高，合规生产
率也会逐渐升高。建议今后可尝试联动企业信息档案，奠定四方共治基础；引入“成本-收益”监管体系，合理利用第三方检测机
构；明确人员责任边界，利用智慧系统实时监管等优化策略，以促进粤港澳大湾区药品安全监管水平的提高。
关键词 博弈论；演化博弈；粤港澳大湾区；药品安全监管

Research on Optimization of Drug Supervision Strategy of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay
Area Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game
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SHI Rongli ，SHEN Kai ，ZHAO Xiaoyan（1. School of Pharmaceutical Business，Guangdong Pharmaceutical
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University/Guangdong Research Base for Drug Regulatory Science，Guangdong Zhongshan 528000，China；
2. Jiangsu Hengrui Medicine Co.，Ltd.，Nanjing 214500，China）

ABSTRACT OBJECTIVE： To provide reference for improving the mechanism of drug supervision in Guangdong-Hong
Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. METHODS：Based on the evolutionary game theory，the stakeholders of Guangdong-Hong
Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in the stage of drug safety supervision were identified；the evolutionary game model was established
so as to obtain the behavioral selection and evolutionary stability strategy of the each party through and put forward the suggestions
for improving the mechanism of drug supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. RESULTS &
CONCLUSIONS：Based on evolutionary game theory，the three-party evolutionary game model of drug administration，drug
inspection and manufacturing enterprises was established. According to the model established in this study，it could be concluded
that：when the compliance cost of the production enterprise was less than the sum of the violation cost and the bribery cost minus
the additional income，or less than the sum of violation cost and punishment and reputation lossminus the additional income，the
manufacturing enterprises could achieve the equilibrium state of compliance production；the supervision probability was inversely
proportional to the supervision cost，and strict inspection was inversely proportional to inspection cost；compliance productivity rate
and strict detection rate were in direct proportion to the intensity of supervision and penalties；the higher the supervision probability
was，the higher the strict detection rate was，and the compliance productivity would gradually increase. It is proposed to link
enterprise information files，lay the foundation of four party cogovernance；introduce the“cost-benefit”supervision system，make
reasonable use of the third-party inspection institutions；clarify the boundary of personnel responsibility，and use the intelligent
system for real-time supervision so as to promote the improvement of drug safety supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao
Greater Bay Area.
KEYWORDS Game theory；Evolutionary game；Guangdong-
Δ 基金项目：2019 年广东省普通高校特色创新类项目（本科）
Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area；Drug safety supervision
（No.2019WTSCX046）；广东药科大学“创新强校工程”项目
＊副教授，硕士生导师。研究方向：医药物流管理。电话：0769-
88207911。E-mail：13924288016@139.com

中国药房 2021年第32卷第6期 China Pharmacy 2021 Vol. 32 No. 6 ·653 ·